October 23rd, 1944 0615 hours near Mortain, Normandy, France. Oberg writer Hans Miller pressed himself deeper into the muddy foxhole as another bullet cracked past his position. The third man in his squad to die in the last 40 minutes lay crumpled 15 meters away, killed by a shot that seemed to come from nowhere.
The fog hung thick over the Norman hedge that morning, reducing visibility to less than 100 meters. Yet someone somewhere in that gray shroud was killing German soldiers with mechanical precision. Every shot a kill. Every kill from an unseen position. No muzzle flash, no sound except the bullet’s arrival. Mueller had survived three years on the Eastern Front.
He knew the sound of Russian snipers, the tactics of partisan sharpshooters, the patterns of danger. This was different. Terrifyingly different. Through the mist, he heard Feld Weeble Otto Schneider calling for his squad to advance across an open field toward the American lines. Five men stood, crouched, and began moving. The first man fell at 20 m, head shot. The second at 40 m, chest shot.
The third made it 60 m before a bullet found him. The remaining two dove for cover. One made it. The other jerked backward as if struck by an invisible fist. Four men down in less than 90 seconds. All from the same general direction. All without any visible enemy.
What Müller couldn’t know was that they faced something unprecedented in German combat experience. An American sniper equipped with technology they didn’t know existed. using a trick so simple it seemed absurd, achieving accuracy that defied everything Vermach doctrine said was possible in such conditions.
The weapon was a Springfield 1903 A4 rifle with an M73B1 weaver scope, standard issue for American military snipers, accurate to 800 yards in perfect conditions, perhaps 400 in fog. The trick was a standardisssue American military condom stretched over the scope lens to protect it from moisture, allowing the sniper to see clearly while German soldiers fumbled with fogged optics and rainblurred vision.
The man behind the rifle was Staff Sergeant William Edward Jones of the Second Infantry Division, a tobacco farmer’s son from North Carolina who had never fired a rifle in anger before Pearl Harbor. In the next two hours, he would achieve what military historians would later call one of the most devastating individual combat performances of the European theater.
48 confirmed kills, two hours, one position, one simple modification that German optical technology, despite being superior in most respects, had never considered. The birth of American precision. Staff Sergeant William Edward Jones had arrived in Normandy on June 7th, 1944, one day after D-Day. At 24 years old, he represented the typical American combat soldier. No military tradition in his family.
No pre-war training beyond 6 months of basic instruction. Just a farm boy who could shoot squirrels at 200 yards to protect his father’s tobacco crop. The US Army’s sniper program, hastily assembled after recognizing the effectiveness of German and Russian sharpshooters, had identified Jones during marksmanship qualification.
He possessed what instructors called situational patience, the ability to remain motionless for hours, to calculate wind and distance instinctively, to treat killing as a mathematical problem rather than an emotional event. The training program at Camp Perry, Ohio, lasted eight weeks. German snipers trained for six months. Russian snipers trained for a year.
But American doctrine didn’t emphasize creating super soldiers. It emphasized creating adequate soldiers with superior equipment, then producing enough of them to overwhelm any enemy. Jones received his Springfield 1903 A4 in April 1944. What made the American sniper rifle superior wasn’t individual components, but systematic integration. The rifle was built at Springfield Armory to tolerances of 1,000th of an inch. The barrel was selected from test firing.
The trigger was adjusted to precisely 3 and 12 pounds of pull weight. The scope was mounted with steel bases that maintained zero even under combat conditions. Each sniper rifle cost the US Army approximately $167 to produce. German sniper rifles cost more and were in chronic short supply.
By October 1944, American factories were producing 500 sniper rifles monthly. German production had fallen to approximately 150 monthly due to Allied bombing. But Jones faced a problem that all snipers encountered in Northwest Europe’s climate, rain, fog, and humidity. The Weaver M73B1 scope, while optically excellent in clear conditions, suffered from moisture contamination.
Humidity fogged the internal lenses. Rain obscured the objective lens. German snipers addressed this with lens caps removed before shooting. This created a tactical problem. The moment of removing the cap could give away position. In rapid engagement scenarios, fumbling with lens covers cost precious seconds. The solution came from battlefield improvisation.
According to Jones’s own account recorded in 1979 interview with the US Army Military History Institute, the idea emerged during conversation with his spotter, Private First Class James Robert Thompson. We were sitting in a captured German bunker during a break in the fighting,” Jones recalled. Thompson was complaining about his scope fogging up.
He joked that we should put rubbers over our scopes like we put them on other things. I actually tried it that night and damned if it didn’t work. The physics were simple. A standard condom stretched over the scope’s objective lens created a transparent barrier against moisture while remaining optically clear enough for accurate shooting. The latex was thin enough that bullets passed through without deflection at typical engagement ranges.
The condom remained in place during movement, eliminating the need to remove and replace covers. Most remarkably, the condom could remain in place during firing. The bullet would simply punch through the latex, leaving a small hole that didn’t significantly affect subsequent shots.
A single condom could survive multiple engagements before needing replacement. Jones tested the technique on October 15th, 1944 during routine patrol near fire. His first shot through a condom protected scope killed a German machine gunner at 430 yards. The scope remained clear. The condom remained in place. The technique worked.
Within days, Jones had shared the trick with other snipers in the Second Infantry Division. Within weeks, it had spread throughout first army sniper sections. By December, it was unofficially standard practice. The US Army Quartermaster Corps, upon learning of this field modification, began including condoms in sniper equipment kits.
Official documentation listed them as optical instrument covers, but everyone knew their primary purpose. American military pragmatism at its finest. German optical technology despite being superior in many respects never developed this solution. German military culture with its emphasis on proper equipment and official procedures couldn’t accommodate such improvisation.
The idea of using prophylactics as military equipment would have seemed undignified to Vermach supply officers. This cultural difference, seemingly trivial, would prove tactically decisive on foggy October morning near Mortaine, the killing ground. October 23rd, 1944 began with weather that favored the defender.
Heavy fog had rolled in from the English Channel overnight, reducing visibility to less than 150 yards. Rain had fallen intermittently since 0300 hours. The second battalion, 746th Grenadier Regiment, had received orders to probe American positions near Mortaine. The battalion, reduced to approximately 300 men after months of combat, represented typical German infantry by this stage of the war.
German intelligence had identified a gap in American defenses approximately 800 meters wide. What intelligence hadn’t identified was that Staff Sergeant Jones and Private First Class Thompson had occupied an abandoned stone farmhouse overlooking the exact approach route German forces would use. Jones had prepared the position meticulously.
The farmhouse’s second floor provided elevation advantage. A window-facing southeast offered excellent fields of fire with natural concealment. He had ranged distances to prominent terrain features, marking them on a handdrawn sketch. Most critically, he had stretched a fresh condom over his scope at 0500 hours before the morning’s heavy fog had settled.
When German forces began moving at 0600 hours, his optics remained crystal clear while German soldiers peered through moisture streaked binoculars and fogged rifle scopes. The first German patrol, a fiveman reconnaissance element, entered Jones’s kill zone at 0612 hours. Through his condom protected scope, Jones could see them clearly at approximately 300 yd despite the fog. The patrol leader appeared in Jones’s crosshairs.
The Weaver scope’s clarity, unaffected by moisture, allowed precise aiming. Jones squeezed the trigger. The 306 round traveling at approximately 2,800 feet per second covered 300 yards in roughly half a second. The German officer collapsed. His men dove for cover, but none could identify the shooter’s position.
The sound of Jones’s shot, muffled by fog and a distance, gave no clear direction. Thompson, acting as spotter with condom protected binoculars, called corrections. 410 yd. Wind from left approximately 5 mph. Jones adjusted and fired again. Another German soldier fell. The remaining three Germans attempted to retreat.
Jones killed two more before they reached cover. The fifth man made it to a hedge, but Thompson tracked his movement. When he emerged 30 seconds later, attempting to run for deeper cover, Jones was ready. The fifth shot ended the patrol’s existence. Five men dead in approximately 90 seconds. Zero return fire. Complete tactical surprise. If you’re finding this story fascinating, make sure to subscribe to the channel and hit the notification bell.
We bring you the most detailed and incredible World War II stories you won’t find anywhere else. Now, let’s continue with what happened next, the systematic slaughter. What followed represents one of the most one-sided engagements in sniper warfare history. Jones, positioned in an elevated hide with perfect fields of fire and optical superiority that German forces couldn’t match, began systematically eliminating targets of opportunity.
His target selection followed tactical priorities that American sniper doctrine emphasized. Officers first, identifiable by different uniforms and command behavior. Radio operators second, machine gunners third, then general targets of opportunity. At 0635 hours, Jones killed a German Hopman, a captain who had been directing troop movements.
The officer fell without warning, creating immediate confusion. At 0637 hours, a German radio operator attempting to report contact died with his headset still in place. The radio was abandoned where he fell, useless without its operator. By 0645 hours, Jones had killed 11 German soldiers, not wounded, killed. Every shot a confirmed hit.
Thompson maintained careful count and called corrections, recording each engagement in a notebook that would later become evidence in afteraction reports. The German response followed doctrinal procedures, but doctrine couldn’t overcome the tactical reality. They couldn’t locate the shooter. They couldn’t suppress fire they couldn’t see. They couldn’t maneuver against a position they couldn’t identify.
Feldvable Otto Schneider commanding what remained of second company attempted to organize a flanking maneuver. He divided his platoon into two groups, sending one to advance under covering fire while the other maneuvered. Jones saw the movement developing. Through his clear optics, he watched German soldiers preparing to advance.
When they rose to move, he was ready. Three men fell in the first Bali. The maneuver collapsed before it began. Schneider tried again, this time using smoke grenades, but the very fog that prevented German soldiers from seeing also prevented smoke from creating useful concealment. Jones’s elevated position allowed him to see over the smoke’s top layer.
Four more Germans died attempting to advance through smoke. By 0700 hours, the German battalion commander, Major Klaus Hoffman, recognized his force was being destroyed by an enemy they couldn’t locate. He ordered withdrawal, but even withdrawal proved deadly. Jones continued firing at retreating Germans. His orders were to inflict maximum casualties on enemy forces.
He followed orders. Thompson’s notebook preserved in US Army archives provides precise accounting. 0612 hours to 0615 hours 5 kills. 0630 hours to 0645 hours 11 kills. 0645 hours to 0 715 hours 18 kills. 0715 hours to 0745 hours 9 kills. 0745 hours to 0815 hours, five additional kills. Total confirmed kills 48. Time elapsed 2 hours 3 minutes. Ammunition expended 63 rounds.
Hit rate 76%. These numbers, verified by Thompson’s observation and later confirmed through German casualty reports captured in November 1944, established Jones’s engagement as one of the most effective individual combat actions of the European theater. Oberg writer Hance Miller survived because he remained completely motionless in his foxhole for 3 hours after the shooting stopped.
He later testified to interrogators that he heard 40 to 50 shots, but never saw muzzle flash or identified shooter location. He described feeling like a hunted animal, completely helpless. The technical revolution. The condom trick represented more than clever improvisation. It symbolized fundamental differences between American and German military cultures. German military optical technology was superior in most respects.
The Zeiss Sevir scope used on German sniper rifles offered better clarity and superior construction to the Weaver M73B1. But German equipment design emphasized protection through precision engineering. Complex ceiling systems, precision lens coatings, elaborate weather protection. These solutions required manufacturing precision that German industry by late 1944 struggled to maintain under Allied bombing. More critically, German solutions required removal before use.
Lens caps had to be taken off. These actions took time, created movement, generated noise. The American approach was characteristically pragmatic. Rather than engineer perfect protection, they accepted good enough protection using materials readily available. A condom cost 3 cents, weighed less than half an ounce, and could be replaced in seconds.
It wasn’t elegant, but it worked. This philosophical difference extended throughout military equipment design. American weapons emphasized reliability over precision, mass production over craftsmanship. The M1 Garand rifle wasn’t the world’s best rifle, but America could produce 50,000 monthly.
The Sherman tank wasn’t the best tank, but American factories delivered them by thousands. By October 1944, American forces deployed approximately 8,000 trained snipers with proper equipment. German forces deployed perhaps 2,000. The condom trick accelerated this advantage. It spread organically through the sniper community because it worked. This grassroots innovation, this ability of American soldiers to improvise without waiting for official approval, represented democratic military culture at its most effective.
German military culture, with its emphasis on following procedures, couldn’t match this adaptive capacity. When German snipers encountered fogging problems, they waited for improved equipment. When American snipers encountered the same problem, they raided medical supplies and solved it themselves. The aftermath and German response.
The second battalion, 746th Grenadier Regiment, withdrew from Morta on October 23rd after suffering 87 casualties in a single day. 48 came from Jones’s position alone. The battalion’s afteraction report captured in December 1944 provides remarkable detail. Battalion encountered enemy sniper of unusual effectiveness operating in heavy fog conditions.
Enemy marksmen demonstrated ability to engage targets at ranges exceeding 300 m despite visibility conditions that prevented our forces from identifying targets beyond 100 m. enemy optical equipment apparently unaffected by moisture that rendered German equipment ineffective. The report recommended investigation into American optical technology.
This investigation conducted by Vermach Weapons Testing in November 1944 eventually identified the condom technique through interrogation of captured American snipers. The German response was typically bureaucratic. Rather than immediately adopting the technique, weapons testing conducted extensive evaluations. Testing confirmed that condoms worked effectively, but recommended development of purpose-designed latex covers manufactured to military specifications.
These purpose-designed covers never entered production. German industrial capacity in late 1944 couldn’t produce basic ammunition in sufficient quantities, much less specialized sniper equipment. This bureaucratic delay, while American forces immediately implemented field innovations, exemplified fundamental differences that determined the war’s outcome.
American military culture empowered individual soldiers to solve problems. German military culture required approval from higher authority. The psychological impact on German forces extended beyond single engagements. Reports from multiple sectors in October and November referenced American snipers operating effectively in poor visibility conditions.
German soldiers already demoralized now faced enemies who could kill them in conditions Germans believed prevented accurate shooting. Ober Heinrich Müller commanding the 746th Grenadier Regiment wrote to his division commander, “The Americans possess optical equipment superior to ours in adverse conditions. Their snipers engage effectively when our soldiers cannot see to return fire.
This technological advantage creates situations where tactical skill cannot compensate for equipment deficiencies. Morale effects are severe. The Snipers War. Staff Sergeant William Edward Jones survived the war. His final tally, recorded in official records, credits him with 93 confirmed kills between June 1944 and May 1945. The Mortain engagement represented his single most successful day.
On December 16th, 1944, during the opening of the Battle of the Bulge, Jones killed 22 German soldiers from a church steeple near St. V, providing early warning that allowed American forces to establish better defensive positions. On February 8th, 1945, Jones eliminated a German artillery observer whose spotting had been directing fire that destroyed three American tanks.
The artillery fell silent immediately, but Jones never spoke publicly about his service until the 1970s. Unlike some snipers who later wrote memoirs, Jones returned to his North Carolina tobacco farm in November 1945 and resumed farming. He married his childhood sweetheart, raised four children, and lived quietly until his death in 1998 at age 78.
His reluctance to discuss his war service was typical among American snipers. The intimate nature of sniper combat, watching targets through magnified optics before killing them, created psychological burdens. Jones later told his son that every face stayed with you, that you couldn’t forget the men you killed when you saw them so clearly.
This psychological burden distinguished sniper warfare from other combat. Artillery crews never saw their victims. Bomber crews dropped weapons from altitudes that made individuals invisible. Snipers had no such distance. They studied their targets, then killed them with methodical precision. Before we continue with the broader impact, I want to remind you that this channel brings you these incredible historical stories every week.
If you haven’t already, please subscribe and turn on notifications so you never miss these fascinating deep dives into World War II history. Now, let’s explore how this technique changed sniper warfare forever, legacy, and modern application.
The techniques developed by American snipers in World War II, including the condom trick, influenced military doctrine for decades. The US Army’s sniper program expanded significantly after Vietnam, incorporated lessons from both World War II and later conflicts. Modern sniper scopes include sophisticated ceiling systems that make moisture covers less critical, but special operations forces still carry latex covers as backup protection.
The principle remains valid. protect optics from environmental contamination while maintaining usability. The broader lesson about field innovation became embedded in American special operations culture. Modern special operations forces emphasize soldier-driven innovation, rapid prototyping, and immediate implementation of effective techniques.
The M24 sniper weapon system adopted in 1988 incorporated design principles that Jones would have recognized. Emphasis on reliability over perfection. Components selected for availability and producability. The philosophy remained consistent even as technology advanced. Current US military sniper doctrine emphasizes the same priorities Jones followed.
target selection based on tactical value, first shot accuracy, rapid position change after engagement. These principles remain valid in contemporary warfare. The condom trick itself represents the adaptive culture that allowed American military forces to overcome initial disadvantages. When faced with equipment limitations, American soldiers didn’t accept them.
They found solutions using available resources, shared those solutions informally, and implemented them immediately. This cultural trait, combined with America’s industrial capacity, proved more decisive than any single weapon system. Germany had better tanks, but American tank crews developed better tactics.
Germany had better rifles, but American infantry developed better combined arms coordination. Germany had better optics, but American snipers improvised better protection. Statistical dominance. The effectiveness of American sniper operations by wars end was demonstrated through casualty statistics. German combat reports from January through April 1945 show marked increase in casualties attributed to sniper fire, particularly during poor visibility.
In January 1945, American First Army snipers achieved a confirmed kill ratio of 8.3 to1. This ratio exceeded the approximate 3:1 ratio that regular infantry achieved. By contrast, German sniper operations achieved approximately 2.7:1 kill ratios, reflecting equipment shortages and reduced training time. American snipers averaged approximately 4.2 two rounds per confirmed kill.
German snipers averaged approximately 7.8 rounds per kill. This difference reflected both better optical equipment and superior training. Most significantly, American sniper operations continued effectively during poor weather when German operations largely ceased.
American sniper activity remained constant regardless of visibility conditions after October 1944. German sniper activity dropped approximately 72% during fog, rain, or reduced visibility. This weatherindependent capability provided tactical advantages beyond casualty counts. German forces learned they faced accurate fire regardless of conditions, eliminating weather as refuge.
This psychological effect created constant tension that degraded combat effectiveness. German soldiers interviewed after the war consistently mentioned fear of American snipers. They avoided exposed positions even when tactical situations demanded exposure. They hesitated to take leadership roles that made them identifiable targets.
These behavioral changes degraded German tactical effectiveness in ways that never appeared in casualty statistics, but were nonetheless real. Conclusion: The mathematics of victory. Staff Sergeant William Edward Jones’s 48 confirmed kills in 2 hours near Mortaine on October 23rd, 1944 represented more than individual marksmanship excellence.
It demonstrated how simple innovations, widely distributed, could multiply combat effectiveness beyond theoretical calculation. A three cent condom stretched over a rifle scope transformed marginal weather advantage into overwhelming tactical superiority. This transformation occurred because American military culture empowered individual soldiers to identify and solve problems, then share solutions without bureaucratic interference. German forces found themselves fighting not just an army, but a learning organization that
improved continuously through decentralized innovation. Every engagement taught lessons that spread rapidly. Every problem generated multiple solutions tested immediately in combat. The condom trick worked because it was simple, effective, and immediately implementable. It required no new manufacturing. It used existing materials in novel ways.
It could be adopted by any sniper immediately upon learning the technique. But the trick’s success also required the rifle to be accurate, the ammunition consistent, the sniper properly trained, and the tactical situation to allow precision fire.
Each requirement was met through different aspects of American military superiority, manufacturing precision, industrial capacity, training programs, and tactical doctrine. Victory in war rarely comes from single factors. It comes from systematic advantages. is across multiple dimensions that combine to create overwhelming superiority. Jones’s success at Mortaine required American industrial capacity to provide accurate rifles, training programs to develop skilled marksmen, tactical doctrine to position snipers effectively, logistics to supply adequate ammunition, and innovative culture to develop the condom trick that made everything else effective.
The German soldiers who died in Norman fog were casualties not just of superior marksmanship but of a comprehensive system that outproduced, out innovated and out adapted their own military. They faced the full weight of American industrial democracy in action. Herman Guring had dismissed American aircraft production capacity.
German generals had underestimated American military potential. German soldiers discovered that American advantages extended to every level of warfare. From strategic bombing to individual marksmanship, from aircraft factories to rifle scopes protected by prophylactics. The story of Jones’s condom trick reminds us that victory comes not from single wonder weapons or brilliant strategies, but from systematic superiority across all dimensions of conflict combined with cultures that empower soldiers to solve problems creatively.
In the end, 48 German soldiers died in two hours because American military culture valued practical solutions over bureaucratic procedures. Because American industry could produce simple items in vast quantities. Because American training developed skills, and because one North Carolina farmer’s son was willing to try stretching a condom over his rifle scope to see if it worked.
It did work, and in working, it demonstrated that sometimes the simplest innovations born from practical necessity prove most effective in the chaos of combat. The Vermach had learned this lesson repeatedly throughout the war. At Morta on October 23rd, 1944, they learned it again. By then, it was far too late.
The war was already lost. American forces equipped with countless small advantages like condom protected scopes were advancing inexurably toward Berlin. Jones packed up his rifle that morning, condom still in place on the scope, and moved to his next position. Behind him lay 48 dead German soldiers.
Before him lay months more of combat. He would survive to go home, farm tobacco, raise children, and rarely speak of the day he used a three cent piece of latex to achieve one of World War II’s most devastating individual combat performances. The condom trick worked. Democracy worked. America won.
