March 22nd, 1945. The phone rang at Supreme Headquarters. Eisenhower picked up expecting routine reports. Instead, he heard four words that made him freeze. We’re across the Rine. It was Patton, but that was impossible. Montgomery’s massive operation plunder wasn’t scheduled for two more days. Churchill was coming to watch the elaborate British crossing.
Artillery, airborne drops, overwhelming force, weeks of preparation. The rine was supposed to be Germany’s impenetrable barrier, crossed only through careful planning and massive resources. Patton had just walted across it with barely a ripple. And nobody, not Eisenhower, not Montgomery, not the Germans, had seen it coming.
What Eisenhower said in that moment, and in the explosive hours that followed, revealed everything about surprise, protocol, and what happens when your most difficult general does the impossible while everyone else is still preparing. This is the story of the crossing nobody planned and the phone call that changed everything. March 1945.
The Ryan River represented more than a geographic barrier. It was Germany’s psychological last line of defense. German propaganda had declared it impassible. A moat protecting the fatherland from Allied invasion. Every German school child learned the rine was unconquerable, that no army had forced a crossing against determined German defense since Napoleon.
Hitler himself had proclaimed that Allied forces would drown in the Rine if they attempted to cross. Eisenhower’s planning staff treated the Rine with appropriate respect. Intelligence reports detailed German defensive preparations. Artillery pre-registered unlikely crossing points, machine gun positions covering every approach, minefields, obstacles, and veteran troops determined to hold the last barrier before the heart of Germany.
Crossing the Rine wouldn’t be like crossing the Sain or other French rivers. This would be opposed by desperate defenders fighting for their homeland. Supreme Headquarters developed two major crossing operations. Montgomery’s Operation Plunder in the North represented the primary effort. A setpiece assault across the lower Rine with overwhelming force.
Over a million men, thousands of artillery pieces, massive air support, and airborne drops to secure the far bank. Montgomery had been planning plunder since January, coordinating logistics, positioning forces, ensuring nothing was left to chance. The operation was scheduled for March 23rd, 24 with Churchill and other dignitaries invited to observe British military professionalism demonstrating how to cross an impassible river.
Patton’s third army advancing through southern Germany would eventually cross the Rine as well. But after Montgomery secured the northern crossing and established the primary bridge head, Eisenhower’s operational plan was clear, Montgomery crosses first with maximum support and publicity, establishing that Allied forces could overcome Germany’s last natural barrier, then other armies would cross at designated points in coordinated sequence.
Nobody planned for Patton to cross first. Nobody imagined he would even try. Third army was fighting through the SAR region miles from suitable crossing points with no special equipment or planning for an opposed river crossing. The Rine crossing was Montgomery’s show. Carefully scripted, meticulously planned, designed to demonstrate Allied operational excellence and British military leadership.
But Eisenhower knew Patton well enough to worry. On March 21st, the day before Patton’s surprise crossing, Eisenhower mentioned to his chief of staff, “George is getting close to the Rine in his sector. I hope he doesn’t do anything crazy like try to cross before Monty’s operation. The last thing we need is Patton turning this into another competition.
” Bedell Smith reportedly replied, “Sir, Patton wouldn’t dare. Crossing the Rine requires specialized equipment, preparation, coordination. Even George can’t improvise a major river crossing. Eisenhower wanted to believe that, but a nagging doubt remained. After Sicily, after the race across France, after every time Patton had done what everyone said was impossible, Eisenhower had learned to never assume George Patton would follow the script.
March 22nd, 1945, late evening, Eisenhower was at his headquarters in Reigns reviewing final preparations for Montgomery’s Operation Plunder. The phone rang. His aid answered, listened briefly, then handed the phone to Eisenhower with an unusual expression. Sir, it’s General Patton. He says it’s urgent. Eisenhower took the phone with mild concern.
George, what’s wrong? Patton’s voice on the other end was barely containing excitement. Nothing’s wrong, Ike. Everything’s perfect. Third Army crossed the Rine at Oppenheim this evening. We’re across minimal casualties. Building bridge head now. Silence. Eisenhower actually pulled the phone away from his ear and stared at it before responding.
George, say that again slowly. You crossed the rine. When? How? Patton’s response was pure Patton. Tonight, Ike crossed at Oppenheim with assault boats. Germans weren’t expecting it. We’re on the east bank expanding the bridge head. Oh, and we did it without the benefit of aerial bombardment, ground smoke, artillery preparation, or airborne assistance.
Just wanted you to know that last line, the dig at Montgomery’s elaborate preparations, was vintage patent. Eisenhower closed his eyes, processing multiple thoughts simultaneously. Relief that the crossing succeeded, concern about coordination with other operations, awareness that Patton had just upstaged Montgomery’s carefully planned operation before it even began, and grudging admiration that George had pulled off another impossible achievement.
George, this wasn’t in the operational plan. You were supposed to wait for coordination with other crossings. Montgomery’s operation is scheduled for tomorrow night with full support. Patton’s response was unapologetic. Ike, we found a good crossing point. Had the opportunity, took it. Why wait for permission to do what needed doing? The Rine’s just another river. We’re across.
We’re staying across. And we’re advancing into Germany. Thought you’d want to know. Eisenhower’s immediate staff, listening to his side of the conversation, watched him struggle with conflicting emotions, frustration with Patton’s insubordination, relief that the crossing succeeded, concern about diplomatic consequences.
After hanging up, Eisenhower sat for a moment in silence. His chief of staff, Bedell Smith, asked, “What did Patton do now?” Eisenhower’s response, recorded by multiple witnesses, captured his exasperation and admiration. George crossed the Rine tonight before Montgomery’s operation without authorization, without special preparation. He just crossed.
I don’t know whether to promote him or relieve him. The next hour was chaos at Supreme Headquarters. Eisenhower had to inform Montgomery that the Rine had been crossed, not by his elaborate operation, but by Patton’s opportunistic assault. He had to brief Churchill that the historic Rine crossing wouldn’t be the British operation Churchill was coming to observe.
He had to adjust operational plans that assumed Montgomery’s crossing would be first and primary. And through it all, Eisenhower knew that Patton, hundreds of miles away, was probably grinning at having pulled off another spectacular surprise. March 23rd, 1945 morning. Eisenhower faced the diplomatic challenge of acknowledging Patton’s achievement while not undermining Montgomery’s operation plunder, which would begin that evening.
His official statement was carefully crafted. Elements of third army have successfully crossed the Rine at Oppenheim. This operation combined with the major crossing operation beginning tonight in the northern sector demonstrates the coordinated allied advance into Germany. All Allied forces are performing magnificently.
The statement was diplomatic masterpiece acknowledging Patton without diminishing Montgomery presenting both crossings as part of coordinated planning even though Patton was completely unauthorized emphasizing allied cooperation over individual achievement. It satisfied no one completely but offended no one critically.
Churchill, informed that his anticipated observation of the first Rine crossing was now the second Rine crossing, was reportedly not amused, but maintained diplomatic composure. But privately, Eisenhower’s reaction was far more complex. To his chief of staff, he expressed frustration. George has made this a competition again.
Montgomery spent months planning a professional, coordinated operation. George sees an opportunity and grabs it without considering the diplomatic complications. Now, Montgomery looks slow and overcautious by comparison, even though his operation is exactly the kind of careful military planning we should encourage.
Yet, Eisenhower also couldn’t deny the results. Patton had crossed the Rine with minimal casualties, under 30 killed and wounded, while capturing a significant bridge head. He’d done it without the massive artillery preparation, airborne drops, and elaborate logistics that Montgomery’s operation required. The operational efficiency was undeniable, even if the diplomatic complications were significant.
Eisenhower called Patton again on March 23rd for a more private conversation. According to Patton’s diary, Eisenhower said, “George, you pulled off another impossible achievement. Operationally, it’s brilliant. Diplomatically, it’s a nightmare. You’ve embarrassed Montgomery before his operation even begins. You forced me to manage another crisis created by your refusal to follow plans.
But god damn it, you crossed the rine and you did it your way. Patton’s response. Ike, I didn’t cross the line to embarrass Monty. I crossed because it needed crossing and we had the opportunity. Isn’t that what we’re supposed to do? Take opportunities when they present themselves. In the days following Patton’s crossing, Eisenhower had time to analyze what the operation revealed about both Patton’s capabilities and the nature of modern warfare.
The Rine crossing wasn’t just another Patent stunt. It demonstrated principles that challenged conventional military doctrine. First, Patton had proven that surprise and speed could overcome defensive advantages that seemed insurmountable through conventional approaches. The rine wasn’t any less formidable on March 22nd than it would be on March 24 when Montgomery crossed.
But Patton’s unexpected timing, his willingness to attempt crossing without elaborate preparation, and his aggressive execution achieved success that elaborate planning might not have improved. Second, the crossing demonstrated that American operational flexibility exceeded that of more traditional military organizations. British forces trained in methodical approaches and careful planning wouldn’t have attempted what Patton did.
German forces, for all their tactical excellence, had become rigid by 1945. Patton’s improvisational aggressiveness represented a distinctly American approach to warfare. See an opportunity, take it immediately, figure out details during execution rather than before. Third, and perhaps most significantly for Eisenhower, the crossing proved that Patton’s controversial command style produced results that more conventional commanders couldn’t match.
Every time Eisenhower had to defend keeping Patton in command, despite controversies, every argument about whether Patton’s value outweighed his difficulties, the Ryan crossing provided vindication. No other Allied general would have attempted or achieved what Patton did at Oppenheim. Eisenhower discussed these lessons with his senior staff on March 25th.
According to meeting minutes, the Supreme Commander stated that while General Patton’s unauthorized crossing of the Rine created diplomatic complications, it demonstrated operational excellence and aggressive spirit that represents American military capability at its finest. The Rine treated as an impenetrable barrier by German propaganda and respected as a major obstacle by our own planning was crossed by Third Army with minimal casualties through surprise and audacity rather than overwhelming force.
Eisenhower also acknowledged the broader implications. This crossing demonstrates that American forces have not only matched but exceeded the operational capabilities of any army in this war. We’ve learned from European military tradition, but we’ve evolved beyond it. Patton’s rin crossing represents operational innovation that combines American material resources, aggressive leadership, and willingness to take calculated risks.
Eisenhower’s post-war writings reveal his ultimate assessment of Patton’s Rine crossing and what it meant for their relationship and military history. In Crusade in Europe, Eisenhower devoted significant attention to the crossing, both for its operational significance and its demonstration of Patton’s unique capabilities.
General Patton’s crossing of the Rine at Oppenheim, Eisenhower wrote, represented both the best and most difficult aspects of his command style. Operationally, it was brilliant. Surprise, speed, and aggressive execution achieved a major objective with minimal casualties. The crossing proved that Audacity could overcome obstacles that conventional approaches treated as nearly insurmountable.
However, the unauthorized nature of the operation created diplomatic complications and coordination challenges that required significant effort to manage. Eisenhower also addressed the comparison with Montgomery’s operation plunder. Both Rine crossings were successful and necessary. Montgomery’s carefully planned operation in the north established a major bridge head with overwhelming force, securing the primary axis for Allied advance.
Patton’s opportunistic crossing in the south demonstrated American operational flexibility and aggressive spirit. Both approaches had value. Both commanders achieved their objectives. That they represented fundamentally different philosophies of warfare was evident and occasionally problematic, but ultimately complimentary.
Perhaps most tellingly, Eisenhower addressed what the Ryan crossing taught him about managing Patton. I learned that trying to control George Patton through strict adherence to plans was feudal and counterproductive. His genius lay in seeing and seizing opportunities that more conventional commanders either didn’t recognize or wouldn’t attempt.
My role as Supreme Commander was not to constrain Patton, but to channel his aggressive spirit towards strategic objectives while managing the diplomatic and coordination complications his methods inevitably created. In a 1962 interview, Eisenhower was asked directly, “What did you really think when Patton called to say he’d crossed the Rine?” Eisenhower’s response, “My first thought was, “Of course he did, because by that point in the war, I’d learned to expect George to do the unexpected.” My second thought was, “How
am I going to explain this to Montgomery and Churchill?” And my third thought was, “Thank God George is on our side.” All three reactions were appropriate. Eisenhower’s final assessment, “The Rine crossing encapsulated everything about commanding Patton. Exasperating, brilliant, diplomatically complicated, and ultimately invaluable.
Would the war have been won without Patton? Certainly. Would it have been won as quickly, as dramatically, with as many memorable achievements? Probably not. The Rine Crossing stands as testament to what aggressive, opportunistic military genius can accomplish when given resources and relative freedom to operate.
Managing that genius was my challenge. Appreciating the results was my privilege.
