The battle for supremacy between the North American aviation F86 Saber and the McCoyen and Gurovich Mig 15 can trace its beginnings to a modest internal design study started by North Americans management in November 1944. The success of their Mustang had been a two-edged sword for the company.

On one hand, they were cranking out the fighters at a furious rate and reaping the profits of their ingenuity. On the other, their importance to the war effort meant that the firm was not being considered as a potential supplier of jets to the US Army Air Force. So, North American funded their own study, mating their straight laminina flow wing to a cylindrical fuselage containing a jet engine.

This study would eventually attract the attention of the US Navy, who would commission it as the FJ1 Fury on the 1st of January 1945. Not to be outdone, the Army Air Force commissioned the closely related XP86 on May the 18th, 1945. 6,000 mi away in Moscow. Comrades McCoyen and Gurovich could not have started from a more different place than their competitors in Los Angeles.

As the in-house OKB of aircraft factory 1 in Moscow, they had inherited a high-profile position in 1939. They did not however succeed in doing much with it in the piston engineed era. Their MiG 1 and Mig 3 were flawed aircraft and although about 3500 were made, they were not popular with pilots.

Lavotkin and Yakovv were the fighter pilot’s choice in the Great Patriotic War. But that lack of success meant that McCoyen and Gurovich had time on their hands when the time came for the Pot Bureau to consider development of a jet fighter. So in February 1945, the MiG OKB started development of what would become the MiG 9. Like the Fury, it was also straight winged, but in this case was powered by a pair of copied Jumo 004 turbo jets.

The MiG 9 wasn’t a particularly good design, but it was the first Soviet jet fighter to be mass-produced and to appear in public. Early progress with the MIG 9 meant that MIG were a front runner when the Ministry of Aircraft Production launched a process to develop a swept wing high alitude fighter capable of 620 mph in March 1947. The wing was a 35° swept aerafoil design captured from the Germans and refined at the Central Hydrodnamics Institute or SARI.

MIG could have modified the MIG 9 to take this wing, but instead elected to take its lessons and start from a clean sheet of paper. The first prototype of the Mig 15 flew on the 30th of December 1947, powered by a Rolls-Royce Nin centrifugal turbo jet. In the US, the North American Aviation Design Team had also been made aware of the 35 degree Arrow Wing via Operation Paperclip. This was convenient timing as the XP86 project was in serious trouble.

With a straight wing, it couldn’t meet the US Army Air Force’s minimum speed requirements, which was set at 600 mph. Unbeknownst to the Air Force, North American management self-funded a project to fit the Arrow Wing to the XP86 in August 1945, thus completing the bones of the Saber.

After much detailed development, the XP86 finally flew for the first time on the 1st of October 1947, only a couple of months before the MiG 15. Engine development problems with the J47 meant that the Saber didn’t enter service until February 1949. The first Mig 15s weren’t with squadrons until July of that year.

Having been developed in complete isolation from each other and having followed quite different paths to completion, it’s perhaps surprising that the Saber and the are apparently so similar. But looking beyond the superficial configuration of a single turbo jet fed by a prominent nose intake, 35° swept wing and single tail reveals a different story.

For simplicity of comparison, I’ll start with the MiG 15 BIS, which formed the majority of the deployed in Korea and the F86 A5 through A7. Turbo jet power was obviously fundamental to both aircraft. The MIG was powered by a Climoff VK1 centrifugal motor. It was 2.6 m long with a maximum diameter of 1.3 m. It weighed 822 kg and it produced 5,955 lbs of force for a thruster mass of 3.1 to1.

If you’ll forgive me mixing my units. North American aviation went another route with the Saber. It was powered by a General Electric J47 G3 axial flow turbo jet which gave 5,500 lb of force from a 1,150 kilo or 2.5,000 lb package. Thrust to mass was therefore about 2.25 to1. The J47 was 3.7 m long and it had a diameter of 93 cm.

In other words, J47 was nearly 50% longer than the RD45 or VK1, but 25% slimmer at its widest point. This leads to the Saber being 37 ft long, whereas the MIG is just 33 ft long. Interestingly, the Saber also has a wider fuselage at 1.6 m versus 1.35 despite the narrower engine. Sabers carried 437 gallons of fuel in their tanks versus 380 in the MIG.

But whereas the Sabers fuel was split between the fuselage and the wings, the  had all its fuel in the fuselage. Both aircraft could carry a pair of drop tanks under wing, when doing so, their ranges were essentially identical at 1500 mi of ferry range and 400 m of combat range. Where both the non-suffix MIG 15 and the BIS had a clear advantage over the early Saber was in climb rate. The MIG’s thrust loading was 0.

54 versus about4 in the F86A. In a straight line, the slower response of the MIG’s centrifugal motor meant that instant acceleration was about the same, but then the MIG would ease out ahead. Up front, the two aircraft’s armament layout reflected very different ideas about how fighters should be armed and deployed.

On the basis that high fire rate, high muzzle velocity, and a flat shell trajectory was judged to be essential for a fighter engaging other fighters, the Saber carried six 50 caliber Browning M3 machine guns in the sides of its nose. With 1500 rounds on board, the total installation weighed about 765 lb, and it laid down 1.4 lb of shells every second.

The MiG 15’s armament setup was totally different, consisting of a pair of 23 mm cannons and a single 37 mm. These were initially NS23 and later NR23 23mm weapons and NS37 later NR37 37 mm. In the later BIS models with the updated cannons, the battery weighed 898 lb with 40 rounds of 37 mil and 160 rounds of 23. It put down a mighty 14.

8 pounds of metal on target every second, and each shell was explosive. The cost of this fire weight was low rate of fire, 20% lower muzzle velocity, and comparatively poor shell ballistics. The 37 mm cannons, in particular, had a tendency to launch their shells in lazy arcs. This reflected Soviet pilots behaviors during the Second World War.

They preferred to get in extremely close and deliver a devastating hit from a range at which ballistics and shell velocity were of little importance. As initially delivered, both aircraft were fitted with gyro gun sights. Although, as I’ll get to shortly, the Saber soon moved on to an advanced radar directed site that significantly improved accuracy in the athality.

The MIG’s gun site was poorly calibrated so that if a pilot aimed where the sight said, he would fire a stream of 23 mm shells above the target and a stream of 37 mm shells below it. Some Soviet pilots simply gave up on the gyro sight, painted marks on the windscreen, and used those to aim. Another famous difference between the types was in cockpit ergonomics. The Saber was welllaid out and well finished.

It had powered controls and a light stick. Just as important, the canopy was a clear bubble with no frames to get in the way. The MIG also had a raised canopy, but lack of experience blowing plexiglass or similar materials meant that it had heavy frames at the front, running front to back directly above the pilot and running across the canopy behind him.

The controls were unassisted and heavy to the point that some pilots welded extra tubing on the top of the stick to provide greater leverage at high speeds. The ergonomic differences arguably had more impact on the combat effectiveness of the two types than any of the other differences.

As John Boyd would famously notice, the Saber pilot had better situational awareness, could react faster to the things he noticed as the controls were light, and he could keep doing those things for longer because he would get less tired. These advantages would deepen when the F86E appeared, equipped as it was with a powered all-flying tail. onto the wings. The Saber’s wings were based on the ME262’s arrow wing, and they were 35.2 degrees swept along the leading edge.

They were fitted with mechanical flaps that automatically extended as the air speed dropped to provide better low-speed control. The MIG’s wing was designed by Sari based again on German research. Of course, one major difference is that the MIG’s wings are mid-mounted with a two°ree anhedral, whereas those of the Saber at the base of the fuselage and have a slight dihedral. The wing shapes are more subtly different, too.

To manage the center of gravity, the aft section of the MIG’s wing route is straight. The Saber’s sailike wing has a higher aspect ratio. It inherently resists span-wise flow better than that of the MIG. Less of the wing surface ends up being blanked as transic speeds are approached, thus allowing control to be retained for longer.

The MIG’s aeraf foil required prominent fences to delay the point at which span wise flow stalled the wing tips. Another critical difference is rather harder to see. The thickness of the saber’s wings skins tapers perfectly towards the tips. Cruder machining in the Soviet Union meant that although they were aiming for something similar, they rarely got it right.

The result was that the Mig 15’s wings were generally very slightly asymmetric, which led to sudden and unpredictable wing dip as speed climbed towards the sound barrier. This made diving the  an act of faith. more ergonomic things against it. In some, the MIG had a total span of 33 feet for a wing area of 222 ft. The Saber was larger with a 37 ft span and 299 ft of area.

Wing loading was therefore about 53 lb per square foot in the 15,000lb Saber versus 49 in the 11,000lb MiG. The theoretical turning benefits of this were basically eliminated by the heavy controls of the MIG and the two fighters were very similar in a pure turning engagement. Out back, the Saber’s horizontal tail is also lowmounted.

The MIG’s tail is higher up the vertical fin. The upshot of the aerodynamic configurations was that the Saber was 11 mph faster at sea level, 679 mi versus 668. But at 35,000 ft, the tables were turned and the MIG was 24 mph faster than the Saber’s 601 mph.

The MiG 15 was a utility industrial product that once good enough was produced in vast numbers. 9,300 were made in the Soviet Union, of which 2/3 were abyss. The Saber, on the other hand, was a commercial success story for North American aviation, who were perhaps the most entrepreneurial of the immediate postcold war aviation manufacturers. Because of this and the enthusiasm of the USAF for innovation, there were many versions of saber.

Even if we don’t count the dogs and hogs, which were sabers only for congresspleasing reasons. The most important variants to talk about in terms of career are the E, which introduced the all-flying tail and standardized the A1CM radar ranging gun site, and the F. Pilots in the early Saber squadrons had been quick to report that the aircraft felt strange to fly in the transonic regime around Mac 1.

The controls seemed to reverse so that if the pilot wanted to pull up, then the aircraft would continue to go down. The controls weren’t actually reversing, of course. They just weren’t responding effectively because at high speeds, the air flow over the elevators prevented the hydraulically boosted circuits from moving them.

The aircraft would just carry on going where it was going. The solution was to fit an all hydraulic system that did away with the cables. It was much stronger and it could easily overcome the additional forces. Although they had now regained control over the aircraft, it still felt sluggish.

This was because the combination of stabilizer and elevators was right for the size of aircraft, but the elevators were too small to give enough control response in transonic flight. The North American engineering team went back to the drawing board again, redesigning the entire operation of the tail so that the stabilizer and the elevators moved together.

In effect, this created a larger elevator surface without changing the physical dimensions of the control surface. The famous all-flying tail was a major breakthrough. Its only drawback was that it removed direct connection between the control stick and the surfaces. Pilots didn’t like this. Once again, the engineers came up with an ingenious solution.

They used a system of bungee cords and counterweights to create a primitive force feedback system, giving artificial feel to the pilot. The Sperry A1B gun site had been introduced on the F86 A5. It incorporated an ANAPG5C ranging radar to automatically acquire targets and calculate lead. Although relatively crude, it filled the empty space above the engine intake, and when it worked, it gave improved accuracy.

The last few of the A5 batch had the vastly improved Sperry A1CM gun site based around the ANAPG30 radar. This unit had a sweep range of between 150 and 3,000 y. It automatically locked on and tracked targets, projecting the lead pipper on the armored glass windcreen. Although a brilliant system when it worked, it wasn’t flawless. Below 6,000 ft of altitude, it tended to get confused by returns off the ground.

The radar, which was a complex mix of temperamental valves assembled by hand, could be finicky and unreliable. When it failed, there was no fixed sight as a backup. But in general, it gave the Saber, which was already a better gun platform than the MiG, an even greater advantage. This was accentuated by its fundamentally more accurate, if much less potent, machine guns.

Although the E- Model Saber was now decisively superior in a turning fight, the Mig 15 was still faster accelerating and faster in the climb, this advantage went away with the F model Saber. It fielded a new variant of the J47, which gave 6,90 lb of thrust. Top speed climbed, but moreover, ceiling was pushed up to 52,000 ft, bringing the Saber much closer to the Mig 15.

More significant was the booster climb rate, which went up from 7,800 ft per minute to 9,850. This took away another big advantage. Saber pilots could now close on the Soviet fighter in a climb. Remarkably, the more powerful engine also had better fuel consumption. The final point to note on the F was that the sophisticated but fragile A1CM site was replaced by a simpler, more rugged and just as effective unit called the A4, appearing in numbers in the middle of 1952.

Even the MIG 15 BIS was outclassed in everything except service ceiling. Later, the 63 wing version of the F model would essentially eliminate even this advantage. Eliminating the leading edge slats to reduce drag and extending the wingspan to improve high altitude performance came at a cost of higher landing speed, but was judged well worth it.

In Moscow, the McCoyen and Gurovich OKB had long since finished developing the MiG 15 by this point. Factories were beginning to churn out the faster Mig 17, and development of the MiG 19 was in its early stages. The Fresco, however, would never come to Korea. Comparing the jets on paper is fun, but as we’re all aware, the pilot in the cockpit was arguably more important in this era, particularly in the first two years of the war.

The Soviets were the first to operate swept-wing fighters over the peninsula, starting on the 1st of November 1950. Since there were no MiG 15 units on the Chinese or Korean borders in early 1950, and none could be spared from Eastern Europe, the air units selected for Korean deployment did not come from frontal aviation. Instead, they were initially drawn from PVO interceptor units around Moscow.

This resulted in some of the most elite units in the Soviet Air Force being assigned to Korea. The 151st Guards Fighter Aviation Division would be the first to fight. It had been formed in 1949 from three distinguished units, the 72nd, 28th, and 139th Guards Fighter Aviation Regiments.

At that time, a MiG 15 interceptor regiment numbered 35 to 40 aircraft and a division usually included three regiments, giving it a nominal strength of about 120 aircraft. Of these, 28th Gap was the most experienced unit. Most of the officers were aces with the best scorers having 10 kills or more.

Their jet experience was more limited, amounting to about 40 to 60 hours on the MiG and some time in the Yak 15. 72nd GAP were air defense specialists. About 70% of the pilots were great patriotic war veterans and they had between 30 and 50 hours on jets on average. A slow start to the jet era in the Soviet Union meant that there weren’t many jets to go round even for elite units.

139th were the least experienced of the three regiments. Only half the pilots were veterans, the rest being postwar recruits. Overall, the average pilot in the 151 IAD had between 350 and 500 hours of flying time, of which 150 to 200 hours was in combat. Ages ranged from 25 to 35, and the average rank was senior lieutenant.

The only weakness in the formation was lack of jet time. This lack of experience with a new era of air warfare told in their early experiences. For the only time in the war, the Soviet aviators enjoyed both technology overmatch and the element of surprise. The 151st therefore only did reasonably well, claiming about 40 kills against a mix of F80s, F-51s, and B29s.

There were two tactical reasons for this which are worth bearing in mind when comparing to Saber. First was the distance from their bases to the combat zone, exacerbated by a lack of drop tanks. This meant that the Soviet pilots were always a bit low on fuel and to save the tanks they were instructed not to jettison them and therefore maneuver encumbered.

The second factor was a lack of adequate radar coverage which meant that Soviet pilots had to patrol at high altitude often in poor weather looking for targets. Although the veterans of the early Soviet intervention could deal with this, the call youths that came later were less comfortable when sha of their ground controllers. Their lives got a lot harder when the first saber unit appeared.

The fourth interceptor wing was hurriedly dispatched to the war zone shortly after the first appeared. Like their Soviet adversaries, the fourth was an elite unit. Many World War II aces were in their ranks, and even the average pilot had about 600 hours of jet experience.

Moreover, their training emphasized fighter-on fighter combat more than bomber interception. They arrived with a good sense of how to use a fast jet to fight a fast jet. The main issue they had was numbers. With only about 18 aircraft initially available, rising to 70 by the end of the winter, the fourth were rather under strength.

The first engagement between the two types occurred on the 17th of December 1950. It was fought at 26,000 ft and resulted in no losses on either side. The first victory on either side was on the 22nd of December. It was a 4on4 engagement fought near the Yalu River. Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Hinton leading a flight from the rocketeers of the 336 Fist had been briefed about the MiG’s tactics.

The Soviet aviators like to approach at high altitude then dive on their opponents before zoom climbing away. So Hinton decided to set a trap. He set up his formation flying at 300 knots, pretending to be an F80 or F-51 flight. Shortly after 10:00 a.m., a flight from the 72nd Gap took the bait. They dove on what they thought was the trailing pair of F80s from 35,000 ft.

Hinton’s formation spotted them coming and broke into a defensive turn. As the MiGs leveled out to shoot, the Saber pilots rammed the throttles forward and went into a spiraling climb. Whether by accident or by design, this was a hard maneuver for the MIG pilots to follow.

Their aircraft were not overly stable in high-speed rolls, and the heavy controls were harder to manipulate under glo. One of the MiGs, piloted by the most junior pilot, Lieutenant Kitinov, Julie overshot and attempted to dive to separate. Hinton rolled inverted and dived to follow. Rapidly closing the distance, he fired a 1 and 1/2 second burst from a range of 600 ft at 24,000 ft of altitude, hitting the MIG in the right wing route. The Soviet fighter burst into flames.

Kittenov ejected but died of his wounds. The other MiGs used their superior acceleration and climb rate to escape back over the border. As I’ve said, the MIG was a faster climber than the early Saber, and it could operate comfortably at 50,000 ft. The Saber topped out at about 45,000, so the MIG flights could pick and choose when to engage.

Early on, the Sabers would sometimes attempt to climb up and attack, losing energy and disadvantaging them in the subsequent dog fight. The tactic of remaining high up was most effective close to the border where the Soviets enjoyed GCI coverage and they could spot the Saber formations early.

Even if they had the element of surprise, though, discipline was essential. 151’s pilots were ordered to make one pass only and then to separate. Early on in the fighting, MiG flights began to employ a great patriotic war tactic called the Klesi or Pincers. In this, a formation of four would split into two elements with the trailers 2 km back at high altitude.

The sabers would often spot the leaders and dive to engage, allowing the trailers to accelerate and attack from behind. This worked to start with, then the saber squadrons learned to wait and look for the second pair, which they could then attack. In general, though, for the MiGs at least, getting involved in a turning fight below 35,000 ft was to give the Saber pilot the advantage.

Its larger, lighter control surfaces, greater stability, and superior visibility were major advantages in a medium or low altitude fight. The Saber pilots also quickly noticed that the MiG pilots were unwilling to dive their aircraft steeply, a result of the MiG 15’s unpredictable transic behavior. The Soviet pilots relative lack of jet experience also told in these early fights.

Dun camera film shows that they misjudged closure rate and they failed to lead targets sufficiently. The US pilot shot more accurately, but they were frustrated by the M3 machine guns lack of hitting power. They would often need to shoot off most of their rounds to kill a MiG. This was not a problem for their enemies.

One or two hits from a 37 mm cannon or a dozen from the 23 mm would cause catastrophic damage to a Saber. Losses were generally light on both sides during the first 3 months. Part of this was because both sides were feeling each other out. Part of it was that there were small numbers on both sides, meaning that the chances of an engagement were relatively low.

Much of it was down to the awful winter weather on the peninsula. There were only 50 or so encounters a month. Early on, both sides realized that the similarities between their aircraft could be confusing in a dog fight. US squadrons therefore painted black and white or black and yellow stripes on their aircraft for identification purposes.

But then, just as 151 were beginning to acclimatize, they were withdrawn. The division was exhausted and many pilots did need a break. Soviet collectivism meant that rather than switching pilots in and out, they would move the whole unit. More than anything else, this unit rotation was responsible for the asymmetric results achieved by Saber and MiG units.

So the 151st were withdrawn. They handed over their MiGs to the Chinese People’s Volunteers Air Force, marking the first transfer of combat ready jets to Chinese pilots. They were replaced by the 324th IAD in April 1951. On paper, this was an upgrade. The 324th Air Defense Division was the elite of the elite, commanded by Colonel Ivan Kosdub.

With 62 victories, he was the top Soviet ace of World War II. Due to the pilot’s celebrity status, Stalin personally ordered him not to fly combat missions. In practice, although the new unit had more jet experience than 151 had when they had arrived, they had no idea what they faced on the peninsula. Their pilots were seasoned but meaningfully younger and less experienced. Only about 40% of them were patriotic war veterans.

The average age was 23 to 27. Although their jet time was an average of 60 to 90 hours, overall flight hours were only about 300. They were interceptor pilots trained to work with GCI. When they engaged the sabers, they stuck to the tight liner breasts veno formation. The sabers had by this point adopted a fluid four.

If they could get into a good position and bounce the sabers, then the concentrated firepower of 823 mm and 4 37 mm cannons from close range was devastating. But coordination was key, and the less combat ready 324 aviators needed time to assemble. The Americans were canny and they learned how to disrupt the Soviet plan through better positioning and early engagement.

Whereas 151 IAD had managed to fight more or less to parody with the US, 324 only managed a loss rate of 1 to2 against the Saber in a tour that lasted until January 1952. They were however successful in driving B29s from Korean skies. Their masked regiment-sized attacks proved impossible for sabers to hold off as they couldn’t engage the MIGs at high altitude and they couldn’t prevent them diving through the formations.

It was during this period that Chinese aviators joined the fight. The first A5 model sabers with the A1CM gun site also began to appear in the spring of 1951, followed by the E with the all-flying tail in the summer. Although the MIG still had better raw performance, the Saber’s maneuverability advantage was now quite considerable.

Its accuracy as a gun platform also took another notch upwards. There were also now roughly twice as many aircraft available to the US wings. 200 Sabers were in theater by July, of which about 160 were combat capable of any one time. The more experienced of the Soviet pilots did still score kills.

As ever in this era, it was those with a natural eye for shooting that did the best. If the MIG’s cannons could be mastered, then they were lethal and they totally outranged the Saber. Major Dmitri Oskin shot down the World War II ace Lieutenant Colonel Glenn Eagleston on the 20th of May 1951 in a single diving pass. He opened fire at 800 m or 2600 ft.

scoring at least one hit on the tail plane with his 37 mm cannon. The Eaglestone was forced to eject. Major Alexander Carve shot down an F86A from the 51st on the 9th of September 1951 from 900 meters. Despite it being a high deflection shot, he scored hits on the Saver’s wing route and Captain John Bolt ejected from his stricken fighter. But in general, the American aviators were able to turn their new capabilities against a new and inexperienced enemy.

As it happens, training Chinese aviators had been the initial mission for Soviet units located in the People’s Republic. Although some Chinese pilots had flown against the nationalist, their pilot pool was not large. Hero of the People’s Republic of China, Wang Hai, became an ace in Korea, by his estimation at least, and eventually led the entire PLAAF.

His recollections of his training in late 1950 are interesting. The vast majority of pilot candidates were drawn from infantry regiments. For example, the third fighter aviation brigade was drawn from the 209th separate infantry division.

Its former commander, Gao Julyang, became the commisar of the new fighter brigade, which was soon renamed as a regiment on Mao’s order. The aviation regiment’s commander, Fang Z, had graduated from a Soviet fly school in China during 1942. But Gao was a longtime veteran who had taken part in the long march and fought the Japanese with a rifle. None of this made him any way suitable to command a fighter formation, but he did anyway.

The vast majority of recruits and officers had similarly politically reliable qualities, but they were not pilots. They had all done 30 hours of training in Yak 11s before being let loose on jets, but that was about it. Training in the Mig 15 consisted of three months of flight basics, followed by two months of combat technique, including intercepts in pairs and full flights, then full regimental formations.

One-on-one dog fighting was taught, as were photo reconnaissance techniques. It was an impressively intense course with recruits rising at 5:00 a.m. 7 days a week without stopping for public holidays. On average, a graduate had 57 hours of flight time. The most experienced had 74 hours. at least has 45.

Wang Hai proudly states in his memoirs that by this point they had mastered the Mig 15 and combat tactics. Their regiment was therefore ready for action on the 25th of April 1951. Unfortunately for them, by the time that they were in action, they were facing the cream of US pilots. When we come to kill ratios, the combination of declining experience levels in the communist pilots and technical development of the Saber combined to result in the tipping of the balance heavily in the Allied favor by the end of 1951. Before the dreaded ratios, we need to talk quickly about the North Koreans.

North Korean pilots were mostly very inexperienced. Even the few pilots that had flown Yak 9 and IL10s in the first couple of months of the war had only basic Soviet training to fall back on. The next generation were even greener. Soviet pilots reported receiving groups of 18 and 19 year olds direct from the North Korean equivalent of aviation clubs.

A few of the senior pilots had flown for the Japanese and were much more capable, but they were rare exceptions. Although many had natural aptitude, the average North Korean pilot was by far the least well-trained and experienced on the peninsula. This was a significant factor in the outcomes they achieved with the MIG 15 irrespective of the quality of the aircraft itself.

By the end of the war in 1953, the CAPAF had three regiments of MiG 15s on strength for a total of about 90 aircraft. MIG numbers on the peninsula fluctuated. Between November 1950 and February 1951, there were about 120 MIGs available. This grew to between 300 and 350 by the summer and to between 400 and 450 by December 1951 as Chinese units began to be made operational.

Peak numbers were achieved in September 1952 when there were between 500 and 600 aircraft in theater with about 100 operated by a single North Korean division. Numbers then declined to about 450 by the armisters. The MiGs were most active in the autumn and winter 1952 as mass night attacks by the B29s picked up. Soviet aviators flew about 2/3 of the overall sorties.

Saber numbers were always lower than MIG numbers, a feature of other global priorities for the USAF and a lack of space on the local bases given all the other aircraft operating over the peninsula. Having started with a mere 18 planes, numbers grew to 90 by the end of February 1951.

They were basically stable for some months and then they grew to about 150 planes in December 1951 as the 51st fighter interceptor wing was fully deployed. Numbers kept growing with 200 Sabers by June 1951 and 240 at the time of the armistice. Many of those were the hard-winged F model and by that point in time the Sabers had essentially achieved complete air superiority despite the disparity in numbers.

Availability rates fluctuated, falling as low as 72% in the spring of 1951, but climbing as maintainers got more experienced and bases improved. The best rate was achieved in December of 51 when it hit 87% availability despite the bitter winter. Availability rates are of course influenced by a wide range of factors, but quality and location of bases are two of the major ones.

They also have an impact on how many missions aircraft can fly in a given day, how tired the pilots are when they arrive, and how much fuel they have. Korea is a relatively small peninsula, and once the front lines stabilized after UN forces pushed the Chinese army back, the distance from either side’s bases to the main area in which fighter combat took place was pretty short.

The fourth fists were based at Kimo, about 175 mi from the Yaloo. The 51st were at Suan, about 200 mi away. Suan was a rather better facility than Kimo. The 51st moved to Osan towards the end of 1952 about 210 mi from the Aru. Depo maintenance was generally at Teu and pilots could rotate back to Japan for a rest. All of the US airirst strips were fully paved.

They had modern refueling and maintenance facilities and radar to cover the immediate surrounding areas. Despite having the radars, they weren’t fully proof against the bed check Charlie biplanes that the North Koreans sent over to drop mortar bombs on grenades on parked aircraft some nights. That aside, better bases meant the US availability rates were substantially better than Soviet ones.

Equipped with drop tanks, the Sabers had about 40 minutes of patrol time in Mig Alley. Over time, the USAF created an impressive tactical air control system to direct the Sabers. Part of this were four C-47 Sky Trains modified as radio relays. One of these aircraft also was assigned to work with Navy fighters.

By 1952, the Saber squadrons had a pretty comprehensive view of when MiGs were getting airborne, and they could get into a good tactical position. The pilots did, however, have to manage their fuel very carefully. The border was a good 150 mi south, and if they spent too long in combat, they might not make it back. In that case, the best option was to head for the coast.

The presence of the Navy and of extensive search and rescue infrastructure meant that with a bit of luck, a pilot could eject over the water and be picked up by a Dumbo after a matter of minutes in his dingy. The MiGs had numerous bases. Since the UN pilots were strictly forbidden to cross the Yaloo, the communists based themselves safely across the border and Tung was the main base for the Soviet divisions and some of the Chinese ones. It had a hardened runway, GCI, and repair facilities.

Only 10 mi from the Yaloo, it was a matter of a few minutes flying time away. Dapoo, 25 minutes from the border, was the alternate base. There was also a network of crude dispersal fields from which Russian aircraft occasionally operated. Chinese aircraft were much more frequent users, and the dusty, poorly surfaced fields drove their operational accident rate up, such as that as many of their MIGs would be lost from crashes around the bases as were lost in combat.

The GCI radar network covered an arc from Dandong to Anshan, primarily to protect the HQ at Shenyang. The radar also allowed detection of B29 raids, defending against which was a primary mission of the MiGs. Excessively tight GCI control was a feature of communist operations, particularly as less experienced and more easily directed units joined the fry.

Although being close to the battle area is an advantage in some respects, it also made the MIG squadrons rather predictable. The Saber units learned to set up kill boxes between 10 and 20 mi south of the Yaloo to ambush the MiGs as they climbed out. In combination with GCI, which didn’t always, or in fact often, see sabers lurking at lower altitudes, there were times that US pilots had a field day against enemies who appear to do nothing to defend themselves.

But if GCI was cooperating and the pilots knew what they were doing, then a MIG flight could swoop down on an unsuspecting Saber unit, hit them hard with the big cannons and be back across the river in safety within a minute. They needed to be quick as later in the war, US aviators almost certainly began to risk disciplinary action by attacking MiGs in the landing pattern at Anung and Dapu.

Those kills didn’t count, but the pilots knew they’d bag themselves a communist. Most of the fighting, of course, took place in Mig Alley, an area roughly 60 mi north to south and 40 mi east to west, located between the Yalu and Chong Chong rivers.

Because of the location of the communist bases, this box had to be crossed by their aircraft to access the front lines further south, and was thus the ideal place for the UN forces to engage them. UN fighter bombers and other strike aircraft also like to roam around this area to attack troop concentrations, rail and road infrastructure, and generally interdict communist operations.

The local geography also made it easy for the UN aircraft to navigate using the coastal plane and river valleys as reference points. The weather over the Yalu was often relatively clearer than elsewhere, and the Soviets had established good radar coverage so their GCI controllers could direct the battle.

Migalli was therefore a curiously good place for both sides to engage in fighter fighter combat. The Korean War is quite unusual in that regard, as it’s more usual for the battle area to favor one side over the other. 80 to 90% of the jet fighter encounters took place in that 2400 square mile area. I think that’s enough preamble. In the war’s aftermath, the US claimed that Sabers shot down about 792 MiGs for the loss of 78 Sabers.

That gave a convenient 10:1 kill ratio. Although it wasn’t much published at the time, the Soviets had a different version of events. They claimed 692 savers shot down for the loss of 335 MiGs to give a 2:1 ratio in their favor. The Chinese claims started out with an imprecise hundreds of savers at the time, but in 1985, this was resolved to 211 aircraft in total and 90 sabers.

They acknowledged the loss of 224 MIGs, the majority to savers, for a ratio of a bit worse than 1:2. North Korea claimed 65 sabers. Their actual losses are harder to establish. The communist claims are, of course, quite amusing in hindsight. They essentially claimed that every saber ever deployed to Korea was shot down.

US claims were accepted for a long time until communist archives began to open up after 1991 and some better data could be obtained. So, what actually happened? US losses are easier to figure out. The official line remains that 78 Sabers were shot down by MiGs. What that doesn’t count are aircraft that were hit by fire from MiGs in a dog fight, managed to escape, and then crashed on their way back to base.

There are also some instances in which the official assessment says that a Saber was hit by ground fire, and the communist records say that the damage was actually inflicted by a MiG. Count all of these extra aircraft, and one comes to a number somewhere around 100 sabers shot down by MiGs. On the communist side, the Soviet numbers can be established with some certainty.

319 Soviet MIGs were determined to be shot down by sabers. Chinese losses are much harder to determine, but they were probably around 70 or 80. The majority of their overall losses were due to operational accidents caused by inexperienced pilots. Data on North Korean losses is based entirely on defector estimates.

There were only a small number of North Korean MIGs operating and only in the later stages of the war. 20 to 25 losses is generally accepted as a good estimate. So overall, we get to about 400 MIGs shot down for 100 saber losses and a ratio of 4:1 in the US favor. This is still excellent, but it’s a little less crazy than 10:1.

Does that mean that a shooting war between the US and the Soviet Union would have turned into a massacre in which the US would have rapidly established air superiority? In a word, no. In the first 6 months of the war, roughly 60 or 70 MiGs were engaged with the same numbers of sabers when availability rates were taken into account.

Although the US aviators had more hours in their aircraft, their overall combat experience was about the same as the Soviets. The A5 Saber was basically equivalent to the Mig 15. Both had strengths and weaknesses. Engagements were small with maybe eight or 12 aircraft aside.

Like battles in a European war, the MIGs were directed by the GCI base at Anung, whereas the savers relied on their leaders on the spot. In this period, 20 MiGs were shot down for 13 savers, giving a ratio of about 1.5 to1 in the Americans favor. After this period, the ratio skewed further and further against the communists as experienced US units fought new batches of inexperienced Soviet, Chinese, and to an extent North Korean aviators, each achieving less than the last.

The US practice of rotating out the pilots when they got to between 100 and 120 missions, but leaving most people and the commanders in place paid dividends. In an all-out war, though, everyone would be engaged. Although US pilots had more jet hours and more hours overall, there will be plenty of green pilots on both sides.

Throughout the history of aerial warfare, the inexperienced die at a high rate. To give you an example, in April 1952, Colonel Gabby Gabeski and his wingman encountered a mixed 16 ship MIG formation of Soviet and Chinese pilots at 40,000 ft. It was two against 16. So instead of turning to fight, Gabeski executed a rolling scissor dive to separate the enemy formation vertically.

The inexperienced MiG pilots followed him individually rather than maintaining mutual cover. Gabreski then buyed his time and picked off one MIG as it overshot. Its pilot unable to control his aircraft as his controls had stiffened at high speed. And then he got another one as it tried to climb away too steeply.

He and his wingman were then able to disengage. A year later on the 12th of April 1953, Captain Joseph McConnell’s flight of four F86Fs was bounced by six MiG 15 bisses from above. Rather than breaking upward, McConnell ordered a split S into a dive. The Chinese pilots followed, but lacking control near transonic speed, some of the MIG pilots experienced wing drop and two of them overshot.

McConnell reversed hard left and climbed back up behind them. He fired a short burst from 700 ft, hitting one MIG, which promptly exploded. Moments later, another MIG pulled too hard, stalled, entered a flat spin, and the pilot ejected. In war, basic mistakes can very easily be terminal.

Soviet and Chinese doctrine kept putting inexperienced pilots into the maelstrom. Even on the US side, there was a feeling that some of the replacement pilots sent to the theater were less than enthusiastic about going into combat. Tactics were also imperfectly communicated from experienced pilots to the new guys.

These issues led to Boots Placet writing no guts no glory, one of the great fighter tactics manuals. Anyhow, based on the outcomes achieved in Korea, my assessment is that the F86A was broadly equivalent to the MIG 15 when flown by equally skilled pilots. I think that’s a generally accepted way of seeing it. From the E model onwards, the Saber was clearly the better air superiority fighter, although the MIG’s heavy firepower and high altitude capabilities made it the better bomber interceptor.

Greater experience with jets made the best US pilots marginally superior to the best Soviet ones, but that advantage was smoothed out by the better coordination that the Soviets have with their GCI. Going strictly on claims, six of the top 10 aces in Korea were actually Soviet.

But given over claiming on both sides, the actual truth is essentially impossible to establish. So with that uplifting review of my own analysis, I think it’s time to finish the video. I hope you’ve enjoyed it. This is a bit of a retro subject. Those who have been with me from the very start will recall that the channel began with a rather less detailed version of this story.

Hopefully, this has resolved any lingering issues related to the pulling of legs with bells attached.